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ABSTRACT  
 
 
Purpose- The purpose of this paper is to assess the performance measurement in the 
UK NHS ambulance service documenting various unintended consequences of the 
current performance framework and suggest a future research agenda. 
  
Design/methodology/approach- The paper reviews the literature on ambulance 
performance targets and documents several unintended consequences of the current 
performance system through an in-depth case study analysis based on interviews with 
trust staff and policy experts along with observation of performance review meetings 
in the chosen trust. Ethical approval for the study was obtained from a local NHS 
research ethics committee. 
 
Findings- Significant unintended consequences of the ambulance performance targets 
based on response times have been systematically documented which are likely to put 
the target under spotlight especially that of the eight minute response. The current 
policy focus to reform the eight minute target by making it more stringent has the 
potential of jeopardising the reform agenda based on developing clinical skills of the 
paramedics and introducing clinical management in the service.  
 
Practical implications- The paper makes an objective assessment of the 
sustainability of the current policy framework and identifies future lines of enquiry for 
further research.  
 
Originality/value - This paper makes an original contribution in identifying and 
documenting the disjuncture between stated and unintended consequences of 
ambulance performance measurement, which will be of value to academics, 
practitioners and policy makers. 
 
Key words- ambulance, response time targets, performance measurement, unintended 
consequences, perversity, NHS 
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Introduction  
 
Discussions on performance measurement in the context of the public sector have 
included views ranging from an extreme position that the public sector provides a 
“leading edge on issues of performance measurement” (Lapsey and Mitchell, 1996, 
p.5) to one that “the performance measurement systems have measured too many 
things and the wrong things” (Atkinson and McCrindell, 1997, p.26). The multiplicity 
of goals and principles in the public sector also imply that individuals in the public 
sector may be more risk averse than their counterparts in the private sector where they 
have to perform fewer, better defined tasks. Consequently the objectives of public 
sector organisations tend to be less well defined and performance measurement 
focuses on the measurable at the expense of less tangible areas representing important 
aspects of the service. While it is acknowledged that performance measurement can 
bring positive benefits, it also produces perverse effects since it takes a restricted view 
of the complexity of the situation in which it is operating (De Bruijn, 2007). As the 
saying goes, "What gets measured gets done," even if not measured or done 
particularly well (see Adcroft and Willis, 2005; Berman, 2002; Modell, 2004). 
 
Academic opinion is divided with respect to the benefit of performance measurement. 
Johnsen (2005, p.5) identifies three groups in this regard: the ‘true believers’ 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1993), the ‘pragmatic sceptics’ (see Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2000; Greiling, 2006) and ‘great sceptics’ who question performance measurement 
(for e.g. De Bruijn, 2002; Meyer, 2002, p.7; Meyer and Gupta, 2004). Mixed results 
have been reported from the public sector in the use of business practices like 
business process re-engineering (McNulty and Ferlie, 2002), benchmarking 
(Holloway et al.1999) and more specifically in the UK NHS (Walshe and Sheldon, 
1998). Despite the criticism of performance measurement within the management 
discourse and in the public sector arena, the past few decades have witnessed a 
proliferation of performance measures in the management of public services and 
steady growth in performance measurement industry (Lapsley, 2008).  
 
The subject of ambulance performance measurement and its unintended consequences 
has remained an under-researched topic in the literature and is an emerging topic for 
research (Bevan and Hamblin, 2009; Radcliffe and Heath, 2009; Heath and Radcliffe, 
2007; Wankhade, 2007, 2008). Response time performance based on 999 call 
prioritisation has been used as the main indicator of emergency ambulance service 
quality in England since 1974 after the ambulance services were integrated into the 
NHS. There are two key ambulance performance standards (see Figure 1) which are 
currently used in England. The ambulance performance is characterised by response 
time targets with a key performance target of an eight minute response (Category ‘A’ 
call). We argue that the current performance framework dominated by response time 
targets is distorting the real nature of work done by ambulance trusts since the 
response time targets are too simplistic, misleading and divert attention away from 
developing the quality aspect of performance by way of developing targets based on 
clinical and patient outcomes. The difficulty in measuring the quality aspects of the 
organisation’s performance has meant that the organisational focus on response times 
has pushed out indicators that are difficult to measure but more relevant such as the 
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clinical performance indicators (CPIs). Snookes et al., (2009, p.549) list development 
of performance measures other than response times as one of the “top ten” priorities 
of research in emergency prehospital care. 
 
 
1. Category ‘A’ calls meeting 8 minute standards: Calls getting a 
first response within 8 minutes for conditions which may be urgent 
and immediately life threatening. With effect from 1 April 2008, the 
new standard, ‘Call to Connect’, measures the time when a 999 call 
is made as against the earlier practice to measure the time after the 
nature of complaint and the location of the caller were established. 
The national target is to respond to such calls within eight minutes 
irrespective of location in 75% of cases.  
2. Category ‘B’ calls meeting 19 minute standards: Calls receiving 
a response within 19 minutes classified as serious but not 
immediately life threatening. The national target stipulates that 95% 
of the time, response should be met within 19 minutes in all such 
cases. 
 
Source: DoH, 2005a, p.56 
 
 
Figure 1: Key ambulance Performance targets 
 
 
This paper presents findings from a detailed exploration of the performance 
measurement in a UK NHS ambulance trust highlighting various unintended 
consequences of the current performance measurement system bringing new 
empirical evidence to some of the dysfunctionalities of performance measurement 
system discussed in the literature (Smith, 1995; Bevan and Hood, 2006; Goddard et 
al., 2000).  
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
It has been argued in the literature that ambulance response time targets are not 
evidence based. Turner et al., (2006) state that response time targets are neither very 
useful indicators of quality nor a useful benchmark for comparing services reflecting 
only the transport element of the service and not the care provided. The study 
concluded that there are no overall benefits from faster response times and “attention 
should be re-focussed on the clinical care provided by crews when they get to the 
scene rather than how fast they get there” (ibid, p.75). A few other studies have 
questioned whether an eight minute response can improve survival after cardiac arrest 
(Pell et al., 2001); in emergency life threatening calls (Blackwell and Kaufman, 
2002); or after traumatic injuries (Pons and Markovchick, 2002). These studies 
suggest that outcomes can only improve with a response time of 5 minutes or less.  
Price (2006, p.127) in a study investigating paramedics’ attitudes towards response 
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time targets concluded that the eight minute response time is not evidence based and 
is putting both ambulance crews and patients  at risk.  
 
Such differing standards are contrary to the claims of the Government as regard the 
usefulness of response time targets especially in cases of cardiac arrest and stroke 
where a quick response by the ambulance service can help to save a patient’s life. The 
benefits of such a quick response are reflected in the targets set out in the National 
Service Framework for the treatment of coronary heart disease (DoH, 2000). This 
emphasis is also reflected in improving the survival rates from cardiac arrest cases in 
the Emergency Care strategy (DoH, 2001) and Taking Healthcare to the Patient (DoH, 
2005a, p.9). Brown et al., (2000) found evidence that driving with blue lights and 
sirens can reduce response time by an average of 90 seconds but that it was relevant in 
only a few cases.  
No universally accepted response-time system standards are reported in the literature. 
Finch (2005) reports wide variance in the international practice of ambulance service 
targets. Different practices also exist for measurement of ambulance performance in 
the UK (Bevan and Hamblin, 2009). Many commentators have also highlighted 
concerns regarding the use of emergency medical dispatch systems such as the 
Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System (AMPDS) as an appropriate tool in the 
performance measurement process. In the first epidemiological study of its kind, 
Marks et al., (2002, p.452) found that 26% of 999 calls given the highest emergency 
code by the AMPDS system resulted in no journey to hospitals being made. Squires 
and Mason (2004, p.727) came to similar conclusions that the flexibility of AMPDS 
and dispatch targets need to be reviewed to permit the successful implementation of 
alternative responses to 999 calls and also alluded to the ‘risk averse’ nature of the 
service in trying to minimise risks by over-prioiritisation. 
There has been an increased emphasis on measuring clinical outcomes, and 
ambulance trusts are increasingly engaged in providing out-of-hours care and 
making referrals to healthcare professionals (DoH, 2005a). Traditionally 
ambulance services have been perceived primarily as an emergency service and 
the training and service provision have been organised around the need of major 
trauma like road traffic collision, severe breathing problems or cardiac arrest 
(Lendrum et al., 2000). The emphasis has been on life support mechanisms to 
stabilise the condition of the patient for a rapid transfer to a hospital. However, 
new statistics reveal that only 10% of the callers dialing 999 have a life 
threatening emergency (DoH, 2005a, p.8). Statistics further reveal that currently 
77% of emergency calls which result in an ambulance journey to hospital lead to 
admissions in 40% of cases whilst 50% of them could be treated at the scene or in 
the community (ibid, p.13). Clearly much of the success on the part of the 
ambulance service to help address the problem of filling hospital A&Es and 
patient beds beyond capacity will depend on ambulance personnel taking on a 
clinically enhanced role including taking greater clinical risks. Current evidence 
concerning safety, effectiveness and funds to support these changes is currently 
insufficient (Snookes et al., 2002) but growing. The recruitment and development 
of the Emergency Care Practitioners (ECPs) having wider clinical skills as a way 
forward was one of the recommendations of the national ambulance review (DoH, 
2005a, p.47). Few recent studies have explored the role of the in providing better 
clinical care to the patients. Mason et al., (2007) have reported how the care 
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provided by the ECPs appears to reduce the need for subsequent referral to the 
A&Es. Similarly, Halter et al., (2006, p 865) also found some evidence that the 
intervention by the ECPs was experienced as considerably better with reference to 
fewer patients from the ECPs being conveyed to the emergency departments. 
Some studies across the Atlantic (Hauswald, 2001; Kamper, et al., 2001) however 
have reported difficulties on account of the paramedics in safely determining the 
patients which do need an ambulance transport or visit to the A&E. Cooper 
(2005) suggests that the UK Ambulance service is in a transition stage with 
significant organisational, professional and cultural challenges.  
 
 
METHODS 
 
This research was carried in a large ambulance trust in the North of England 
(hereafter referred to as Delta trust) between 2006 and 2008. The principal aim of this 
research was the exploration of performance measurement and organisational culture 
in the ambulance service and to identify unintended consequences of the performance 
measurement system using a case study approach. Given the diversity of the size, 
performance histories, geographical areas served and different organisational 
structures and cultures in the Delta trust, this one ‘big’ case was a useful unit of 
analysis for theory building and provided useful comparisons within the same 
organisational context (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989). Ethical approval 
was obtained from a local research ethics committee. 
 
The research participants included senior board executive and non-executive 
directors, managers, frontline staff representing paramedics, 999 Call takers and Call 
dispatchers working in the Emergency Medical Dispatch Centres (EMDC) in the 
chosen trust. To further improve the validity and reliability of the findings, four senior 
policy experts were selected and interviewed. A ‘stratified purposeful’ strategy (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994, p.28) was considered to be the most effective method in 
recruiting the participants in this study. The choice of the experts was also guided by 
the issues of access and their involvement in the current ambulance policy 
formulation and implementation. Access was also facilitated by two senior trust board 
executives interviewed. Three of the experts have been involved in very senior policy 
roles within the DoH dealing with the clinical and managerial aspects of ambulance 
policy. One senior ambulance trust specialist within the Audit Commission in 
England was also interviewed. This helped to get a rounded understanding of the 
issues considered in this paper. The chosen trust and the individuals are not identified 
for reasons of anonymity and confidentiality. 
 
Seventy-two semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted in this study in two 
phases between January 2006 and June 2008 with some of the research participants 
interviewed twice.  All interviews were tape-recorded with prior consent to facilitate 
subsequent analysis. Simultaneously, notes were also taken during each of the 
interviews. The formal interviews followed a broad thematic guide that aimed at 
gathering occupational narratives, understanding pre-existing performance practice, 
and exploring the individual perception and attitudes of the research participants 
(Currie et al., 2008). Themes undertaken for analysis were developed from the review 
of the literature and were refined during the interviews (for instance the Call to 
Connect target). The process of data analysis was guided by adopting the strategy of 
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relying on the theoretical propositions that have influenced the research objectives 
and the overall aim of the case study (Yin, 2003). QSR NVivo Version 7.0 was used 
in this investigation to facilitate the analysis of data using the constant comparision 
method (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
 
At the corporate level, several open trust board meetings and internal executive 
meetings were observed and the author recorded how senior executives implemented 
DoH performance guidelines, analysed trust performance and dealt with incidents and 
staff issues. Time was also spent in observation of area management team meetings 
(performance meetings) to understand how these groups were responding to policy 
and attempting to make performance improvements. From the perspective of the 
managers, observation focused on the extent of managerial contribution and 
participation in performance improvement within the trust. At the micro-level of 
frontline staff, operations in the EMDC control rooms were observed and time was 
spent in ambulance stations, travelling with ambulance crews and in the canteen 
where managers, junior executives, and frontline staff took breaks. In total, around 
150 hours of observation took place.  
 
There were some limitations to the data which was collected largely from one single 
case. The popular view is to discount the possibility of generalisation of findings from 
a case study research. However in-depth case studies offer the opportunity to generate 
knowledge which is of relevance to the wider public service reform agenda. It further 
helps to focus on more tacit and less obvious aspects of the setting under investigation 
(Dyer and Wilkins, 1991).  Selection of the chosen case and the outside experts 
provided greater contrasts in the experience of the actors than a sample of multiple 
cases where a researcher would have been constrained to focus on surface data rather 
than deeper social dynamics. 
FINDINGS 
The paper has argued that most public sector performance indicator designs have been 
implemented on the assumption of yielding gains in efficiency without paying too 
much attention to the potential costs of such schemes or to the unintended 
consequences of such systems. Five unintended consequences identified in the current 
ambulance performance framework are discussed next.  
Tunnel vision 
Tunnel vision is defined as an emphasis by management on phenomena that are 
quantified in the performance measurement scheme at the expense of those that are 
unquantified (Smith, 1995, p.286). The study found clear recognition that the current 
response time indicators, and especially the eight minute target, do not give a holistic 
view of the trust performance. The single minded focus on the eight minute response 
has diverted attention from equally important but unmeasured or immeasurable 
aspects of performance (e.g. clinical performance). Many senior executives argued 
that if the service solely concentrates on the Category ‘A’ target, the ambulance 
service will never change: 
     “In reality we don’t want to be obsessed with 75% and I think it’s a real 
frustration within the organisation that that 75% within eight minutes is the 
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obsessive picture…I don’t care if we get there in 8 minutes or 7 minutes and 
57 seconds or 8 minutes and 2 seconds... The issue should be what 
difference we make to that patient when we got there.” 
                                                                                Senior Board Executive I  
 
The NHS ambulance trusts in England are funded by the local Primary Care Trusts 
(PCTs). This funding is often based upon projections of future service demand. The 
weekly performance of each PCT was a regular item on the agenda of weekly internal 
review meetings in the Delta trust attended by the author. This was frequently cited as 
diverting attention and resources away from other important aspects of the trust 
performance such as the training of ambulance crews and managers: 
          “While we’d love to modernise, actually every time we get anywhere near it 
they {PCTs} give us another target to achieve with the money they’ve got... 
They either invest in us and they get what they pay for or they don’t invest 
and they get nothing but they can’t have something for nothing.. Simple.” 
                                                                                    Senior Board Executive II 
 
Ambulance boards have been criticised for being heavily focused on response time 
targets and the board discussions for having an operational focus (drfoster 
intelligence, 2006, p. 21). As one participant lamented: 
 
       “The board should continue to remember that we are a clinical organisation, 
we are not an operational organisation and we are not a financial 
organisation.  The operations and the finance support our mission which is 
to deliver good clinical care.” 
 
                                                                        Senior Board Executive III 
 
 
Evidence gathered in the study reveals that the agenda of clinical education and 
workforce training appears to have been ‘hijacked’ to some extent by the operational 
exigencies of meeting eight minute response target. This hypothesis is confirmed by 
the views expressed by many participants that staff development was sacrificed and 
staffs were re-deployed to meet performance targets: 
 
       “If I’m honest, everyone says training is very important and everyone 
probably does think it very important.  In practice, it’s sacrificed to meet 
targets and we’ve done that here. So, unfortunately training is one of the 
first sacrificial lambs when it comes to meeting targets.” 
 
                                                                                     Senior Training Manager  
                                               
 
From the discussion above, we can argue that the ambulance response time targets 
have caused a ‘tunnel vision’ due to the emphasis on measuring operational 
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performance at the expense of important but unmeasured aspects of the organisation’s 
performance (e.g. clinical outcomes). Emphasis on response time targets distorts the 
nature of the ambulance service to the detriment of non quantifiable objectives.  
 
 
Myopia 
 
Myopia is the pursuit of short term targets at the expense of legitimate long term 
objectives induced by performance indicators (Smith, 1995, p.288). We argue that the 
current ambulance performance indicators distort the priority for long term clinical 
performance indicators or sometimes pushed to deliver short term targets without a 
view to the long term. The new eight minute standard, called ‘‘Call to Connect’’ 
reflects how a short-term approach can be detrimental to the development of clinical 
outcomes for the ambulance trusts. 
 
‘Call to Connect’ is one of the recommendations of the government (DoH, 2005a, 
p.39) to address concerns about inconsistencies across ambulance services applying 
different performance requirements. The review recommended that for the purpose of 
measuring 999 Category ‘A’ and Category ‘B’ response times, the clock should start 
when the call is connected to the ambulance control room and not when the key 
information regarding the location of the caller and the main problem is collected by 
the Call taker in the EMDC control room (see figure 2). This change was scheduled to 
be introduced in April 2007 to allow sufficient time for the necessary technical and 
operational changes to take place. However due to various difficulties, the date was 
moved to 1
st
 April 2008 after which the new standards became operational. Evidence 
from the study suggests that this new target can cause ‘myopia’ and can lead to 
perverse consequences. 
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Figure 2: New ‘Call to Connect’ Standard 
The implications of this change are enormous for the ambulance service due the 
manner in which the Category ‘A’ Call is being measured along with its impact on 
service delivery. Senior executives were quick to point out its immediate implication: 
 
       “‘Call to Connect as a target will mean that we have to gain or lose 50 
seconds from our current time… If we did nothing to work differently and 
just put the additional amount of resources required to now have enough 
ambulances to hit that target, that extra 50 seconds, you are talking about 
having to get a performance gain of around 18%.  Every 2% gain you are 
looking at something like £1.5m costs.  You are talking £25-30 million.  And 
that’s just us.” 
                                                  
                                                                                   Senior Board Executive IV  
 
Some respondents were concerned that the ‘Call to Connect’ target has the potential 
to derail the process of developing the clinical skills of the paramedics due to further 
shortening of the eight minute response time: 
       “Taking Health Care to the Patients hangs about identifying what the patient 
actually requires as early as possible and then doing it.  Well how can you 
do that when you’ve got 8 minutes to get there which is now reduced to 7 
minutes and 10 seconds anyway due to ‘Call to Connect’? You can’t afford 
to take more risks anyway.” 
                                                                                Senior Board Executive V 
 
Informal discussions with managers and observations made during performance 
meetings suggest that many members of staff did not still grasp the real implications 
of ‘Call to Connect’ and perceive it to be a management problem: 
       “Staff thinks that ‘Call to Connect’ is only a control room issue and it is their 
job to ensure that calls are handled faster and vehicles dispatched more 
efficiently.” 
                                                                           Senior Operational Manager I 
 
Paramedics who participated in the research seemed to be aware of this new target but 
found it difficult to understand the rationale behind it. Informal discussions in the 
‘stations’ left a feeling that ‘Call to Connect’ is probably seen as a route to make 
people do things they prefer not to: 
 
       “The clinicians out on the road haven’t got a clue.  They don’t even know this 
is in the background. ‘Call to Connect’ just hasn’t registered, it’s just gone 
straight through because it means neither pay nor improvement in terms and 
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conditions.. Staffs think it is a conspiracy against their working conditions 
because of Agenda for Change and the job evaluation process.” 
                                                                                       Senior Paramedic I 
 
One expert believed that this new target was ‘short-termist’: 
 
        “Call to Connect, the latest short term target is putting pressure on response 
times. What get sacrificed when everybody has to go out and do the job are 
training, education and supervision.” 
 
                                                      Ambulance trust Specialist, Audit Commission 
 
 
Another expert outlined the relative gains for the patients due to a quicker ambulance 
response but acknowledged some perverse behaviour on account of the new standard:  
 
       “It has affected the speed of other reforms in the service absolutely because 
it’s been all-consuming so everyone is always looking out; everyone is 
always focused predominantly on performance and this target. Has affected 
some of the other things we would do? Yes it has.  There’s no doubt about 
that” 
 
                                                                                         DoH Professional Expert I   
 
 
Other experts were also quite candid in accepting that the current target has affected 
the ambulance service reform process set out in the ambulance review (DoH, 2005a): 
 
 
       “I think the aim of Taking Healthcare To The Patient  had been to try and 
move away from time targets…So the aim was to try and focus more to have 
speed for those that count but then the rest have outcomes or indicators or 
clinical indicator measures. Now, has that happened in the right order and 
at the right speed? The answers probably is no. Does it encourage 
dysfunctional behaviour? Probably yes, it does.” 
 
                                                                      DoH Professional Expert II  
 
 
During the period of study, the management of the Delta trust grappled with devising 
strategies to meet this new national target. It dominated the agenda of the internal and 
trust board meetings and constantly occupied the minds of senior executives. While 
the implementation of the target is a relatively recent phenomenon (since April 2008) 
it is fair to say that ambulance services are currently spending lot of their time and 
efforts in meeting the ‘Call to Connect’ target. The concerns from various quarters 
indicate a need for greater debate on the subject. One respondent summed this issue 
quite nicely: 
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       “Let’s deliver the service in a different way; let’s not start the clock in a 
different way.” 
 
                                                                                     Senior Area Executive I 
 
Ossification  
Ossification is organisational paralysis brought about by an excessively rigid system 
of performance evaluation inhibiting innovation (Smith, 1995, p.299). It occurs when 
performance measures have lost their purpose but are not revised or removed. 
Previous section has argued that the eight minute target is not evidence based. Experts 
and clinicians interviewed in the study questioned the clinical evidence behind the 
eight minute target: 
 
       “Now we could argue whether it should be 8 minutes or 10 minutes or 7 
minutes or 9 minutes…  To be honest, if it is a cardiac arrest and you are 
not there within 2 minutes, then 8 minutes was the tipping point to say 
nobody survived. So why we picked 8 minutes as the response time is a 
mystery to me.” 
 
                                                                                                       Clinician I 
 
 
One expert was more explicit about the lack of clinical evidence for the eight minute 
target: 
 
    “I must admit I’m a big cynic of the 8 minute target…Actually a third of 
people who have a cardiac arrest don’t even get into Category A. So you’ve 
got a third of patients who don’t even need 8 minutes and don’t even get into 
the target and of course then the target is only 75% anyway. So actually 
you’ve probably only half of cardiac arrests who get an ambulance within 8 
minutes.” 
 
                                                                               DoH Professional Expert I  
 
 
There was recognition by senior policy experts about the relative lack of clinical 
evidence behind the ambulance eight minute target: 
 
       “Well it’s pragmatic in the sense that probably 6 minutes is better but is 
unrealistic and I think to have something like the 8 minutes. I don’t think we 
can make it shorter at the moment. I think, it is not unreasonable and it 
really keeps people on their toes... But you’ve got to be realistic about 
resources and what we’ve got.” 
 
                                                                                    DoH Professional Expert II  
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One expert agreed that the current response time regime placed too much emphasis on 
the time element at the cost of developing clinical aspects of patient care or clinical 
performance indicators: 
 
         “There’s definitely a correlation. It’s not just down to one thing; its not just 
speed. Obviously it is what happens at the scene as well.”   
                                                                                  
                                                               DoH Professional Expert III  
 
 
It was interesting that the trust management was still contemplating and talking about 
the ways to deal with the new clinical agenda more than two years after the 
recommendations of Taking Healthcare to the Patient (DoH, 2005a) came into effect: 
 
        “I think it’s a good opportunity to start afresh… We will bring in a much 
stronger clinical management structure at an operational level.  I will now 
have the structure to push clinical governance forwards right down to 
patient level.” 
 
                                                         Clinical Governance Manager (March 2007)  
 
 
But later: 
 
        “The lack of clinical governance is still there. There is a clear divide 
between operational management versus clinical direction. The 
organisation is still run very operationally.” 
 
                                                             Clinical Governance Manager (June 2008)  
 
 
The arguments of the research participants in the case study on the relative benefits of 
the eight minute target are supported in the literature: 
 
      “There appears to be no robust evidence on the health benefits resulting from 
improvements in response times above 8 minutes other than from reducing 
ambulance response times to below 8 minutes for cardiac arrest patients.” 
            
                                                                                 DoH (2005a), p.2 
 
 
Ambulance response time targets have not been put up for scrutiny of review and 
have remained largely unchanged since 1996. The national review (DoH, 2005a) re-
visited the targets but only for the purpose of making them more stringent with the 
new ‘Call to Connect’ standards discussed above. As a result, the opportunity to look 
for alternative methods to measure performance has been missed. It thus appears that 
current performance framework is stifling innovation and leading to ossification. 
While it is important to acknowledge that no measurement scheme can hope to 
capture all the consequences of a complex healthcare organisation’s activity, it is 
however important, as Smith (1995) argues, to constantly scan the environment to 
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detect unanticipated consequences and to embed the performance measurement 
scheme in broader monitoring system such as peer reviews and accreditation (Audit 
Commission, 2000; Bevan and Hamblin, 2009).  
 
 
Sub-optimisation 
 
Sub-optimisation is the pursuit of narrow local objectives by managers at the expense 
of organisational objectives as a whole (Smith, 1995, p.286). This problem can be 
endemic to any hierarchically structured organisation in which control is secured by 
explicit performance criteria. This study found that the corporate objectives of the 
Delta trust were not always aligned with the specific incentive structure for different 
staff of the trust. This was evident in the manner that good performance against the 
eight minute response was seen by the trust management as an important aspect of 
maintaining good relations with the PCT Commissioners who fund trust activities. 
While there was a clear executive focus on attempts to engage staff in major strategic 
issues and to facilitate ‘clinical ownership’, some participants mentioned difficulties 
in getting the other occupational communities ‘on board’: 
 
         “If you went down to a sector manager and said what this Trust is about, 
they'd say, ‘operational performance.’ They wouldn’t even think about 
clinical quality. So we've got a long way to go.” 
 
                                                                               Senior Area Executive II  
 
 
The need for better clinical supervision and leadership to improve the clinical 
governance structure in the trust was identified by a small number of respondents. 
Senior trust executives stressed the strong desire to increase the ability of the staff. 
Evidence from this study suggests that there can be difficulties for staff involvement 
in objective setting if cultural differences exist between different staff groupings 
within an organisation: 
 
    “If you talk to road staff about achieving Category ‘A’ performance they just 
laugh in the sense of well that’s your problem to get the ambulances in the 
right place, to make sure we can get there within the time… What we 
actually need to do is to take a non professional blue-collar workforce and 
migrate it into being a professional workforce.” 
 
                                                                                 Senior Board Executive VI  
 
 
      “I think operational managers understand what the performance targets are, 
why we have got them. But whether they agree with them is another issue.” 
 
                                                                                     Senior Area Executive III 
 
 
Few managers shared the executive concern about the levels of commitment of 
frontline staff towards the performance targets: 
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       “There is widespread misunderstanding amongst staff about performance 
targets... Stafsf are unsure as to their value and in some cases hostile to the 
targets.” 
 
                                                                             Senior Operational Manager II 
 
 
The reasons for these differing perceptions are quite peculiar to the ambulance 
service. Frontline staffs are based in stations which are scattered over a large 
geographical area distant from their headquarters and work mostly without direct 
supervision. This makes communication within the ambulance service difficult. The 
different nature of work of the different occupational cultures places different 
pressures on each group (Wankhade, 2007a cited in Radcliffe and Heath, 2009). The 
lack of a clear perception by staff about performance targets also reflects a lack of 
communication and education both within the organisation and within the wider NHS.  
 
 
Measure fixation 
 
Measure fixation is defined as an emphasis on measures of success rather than the 
underlying objectives (Smith, 1995, p.290). If a measure does not fully capture all 
dimensions of the associated objective then managers may be encouraged to focus on 
the performance indicator itself rather than the desired outcome. The current eight 
minute response target does not make any distinction between geographical localities 
to expect an ambulance response within eight minutes in rural areas affecting patient 
safety and quality of care: 
 
        “Rather than everything being life threatening and needing urgent responses 
within 8 minutes and then 19 minutes, there has to be some recognition as it 
is in Scotland that there is a urban model, a rural model and the remote- 
rural model and no matter how quickly you are wanting a technician to 
respond to somebody in a remote rural environment you are not going to get 
there in 8 or 19 minutes. It’s just physically not possible.” 
 
                                                                           Senior Board Executive I 
 
 
Measure fixation was also noticed by studying the tactics used by the trust to meet the 
eight minute target, jeopardising the safety of the staff and the patients. Ambulance 
trusts make use of the Rapid Response Vehicles (RRV) to meet the eight minute 
target by using what is referred to as the ‘Front Loaded Model’ in the ambulance 
jargon. Such a model was also in use in the Delta trust. What it means in practice is 
that once a single paramedic in a RRV (car) reaches the scene of an accident within 
eight minutes, the patient might then have to wait for a further period of time for an 
ambulance to arrive to carry the patient to the hospital since sending a back- up 
ambulance may not be a priority once an emergency is responded to within eight 
minutes. Such a practice has implications on organisational costs. Another tactic used 
by the ambulance trusts (across England) is the involvement and use of the 
Community First Responders (CFRs) in responding to urgent 999 calls. In an opinion 
survey of paramedics, Price (2006) found some evidence that CFRs with basic 
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training and inadequate clinical skills were deployed in a number of inappropriate 
emergency situations solely to meet the targets. Such tactics can have a de-motivating 
effect on staff morale and performance: 
 
       “I'd like to wait ten minutes for a paramedic rather than just have some 
person as a first responder who hasn’t really got a clue but because they’ve 
got a defibrillator so you can tick the 75% box and I think that's incorrect.” 
                                                                                              
                                                                                              Paramedic II   
 
 
Further evidence of measure fixation was recorded by examining the actual 
experience of meeting the ‘Call to Connect’ target in the Delta trust. In order to meet 
the pressure of this new target, staff and vehicles were dispatched once a Category 
‘A’ call is made to the EMDC control. This meant that staff had to rush to the scene 
of the emergency without having any details about the main problem (e.g. social or 
medical condition) of the caller. This has implications for the safety of the crews.  
 
Some respondents further argued that the current eight minute target only measures 
one aspect of performance- whether ambulance trusts hit this target within 75% of the 
cases which is rather simplistic and should look across the distribution of response 
times rather than just considering performance at a single point of eight minutes 
(crowding performance towards the target): 
 
       “We need some measure of, well actually we were achieving 8 minutes but its 
not a skewed 8 minutes, and it’s a normal distribution with 50% of people…. 
You know you could almost say you know it could get too complicated to 
manage, but it’s almost 75% within 8 minutes and 50% within 6 minutes 
and 25% within 4 minutes.  You know so you have a series so it has to be a 
normal distribution and not just aiming at 8 minutes so you have to have a 
generalised improvement.” 
                                                                             DoH Professional Expert I  
 
 
Evidence discussed here suggests a clear measure-fixation in the ambulance 
performance measurement.  It further suggests that what has happened with the eight 
minute target is that it has ‘skewed’ how people react. It also highlights the need for 
better education, publicity and appraisal of any performance targets. 
 
 
Systemic dysfunctions 
 
The Government’s focus is on improving the ambulance response time targets by 
making it more stringent in the form of new ‘Call to Connect’ standards. We argue 
that the stated objective is in conflict with and contradicts the broader emergency care 
strategy. While the new ‘Call to Connect’ target has the potential to put additional 
pressure on ambulance performance, the issue of hospital (A&E) relocation can 
nullify any gains that might be achieved due to this  new target. This decision of the 
government has major implications for ambulance services in terms of their job cycle 
and can seriously undermine their performance targets: 
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       “I think the hospital issue about reconfiguration is a really serious one 
because even if you look at the hospitals that have reconfigured already, 
they can be actually furthest from all previous hospitals. Well that increases 
the travel time which means their availability for 999s back in the job cycle 
they have come from is obviously reduced.”                         
                                                       Senior Board Executive II 
 
Performance of an ambulance service will improve if the job cycle is completed more 
quickly releasing the crew for the next job. There are also issues regarding the 
handover of patients at the hospital A&E departments. Often ambulance crews are 
seen waiting outside A&E departments unable to respond to other calls. In its report 
the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI, 2003) expressed serious concerns 
about the handover of patients at A&E which sometimes may be due to the need for 
A&E departments to achieve their own target that no patient should wait for more 
than four hours from arrival in A&E to admission, transfer or discharge a 
phenomenon noticed by the author while travelling with the crews. Some of the 
respondents complained about the lack of consultation on this issue: 
      “There’s always a great load of talk about silo working isn’t there?  But the 
people who silo work the most are the Government. I think fundamentally 
they don’t care because the agenda which is driving that is a political one; 
it is not a clinical agenda. You have to understand why they want to close 
hospitals.” 
                                                                              Senior Board Executive IV 
 
The Government’s policy was defended by one expert who argued that this issue 
could be handled locally by individual ambulance trusts: 
 
       “The ambulance service has calculated what extra cover they need to ensure 
that in terms of ambulances and complete set of paramedics and that is built 
into the costing and the PCTs then have to fund that… It’s not the 
department’s problem.  It’s a local problem and I think each locality has to 
deal with it in its own way.” 
 
                                                                                   DoH Professional Expert II  
 
 
Apart from having a bearing on organisational performance, this issue has legal 
implications not only for the ambulance service, but also for the wider NHS. A recent 
study has suggested that a 10 km increase in straight line distance is associated with 
around a 1% absolute increase in mortality (Nicholl et al., 2007). While this evidence 
may not be conclusive enough to question the government’s judgement on specialist 
centres, it does question some of the logic behind it: 
        “The hospital closures mean that we have to take more clinical risks then we 
would have to. For example there is a danger of more babies being born at 
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the back of the ambulance. Paramedics are not trained midwifes. If you look 
at the history of NHS litigation and the way risk is assessed, maternity 
services have a big chunk of those cases.”                                           
                                                                     Senior Board Executive IV 
 
The new agenda of building clinical leadership, the clinical governance framework for 
treating more patients at the scene and in the community is being threatened by the 
contradiction between faster ambulance response (Call to Connect) and hospital re-
organisations leading to longer ambulance journeys. One respondent summed up the 
frustration: 
 
      “You’ve got these policy papers from experts coming out that say we can now 
take an extra 20 minutes to take a patient to hospital. So why have we got to 
get there so quickly if actually we can then say well actually now we are 
going to go 20 minutes further to reach the trauma centre.  Well that doesn’t 
stack up because what’s the point of us running to get there in 8 minutes to 
then say well actually you can now take 40 minutes to get the patient into a 
hospital.” 
 
                                                                           Senior Board Executive III 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The evidence discussed above questions the efficacy of the current ambulance 
performance framework used in England. The lack of clinical evidence alluded to by 
the policy experts puts the main target for ambulance trusts under scrutiny. It can then 
be argued that the ambulance response to a 999 call is essentially a response to the 
call, not to the patient. The AMPDS system used by a majority of ambulance trusts in 
England simply prioritises the speed of the response in terms of eight minutes 
(Category ‘A’) or nineteen minutes (Category ‘B’) responses. Since the tendency of 
the system is always to over-prioritise due to the specific nature of the questions the 
999 caller is asked and notwithstanding the risk averse nature of the service, more 
calls are being categorised as Category ‘A’ than really need to be. One expert argued 
that if the staffs knew that it’s got to be blue lights and sirens and even if only half of 
the time it really is needed, they would feel happy to “go for it”.  
 
It is nevertheless important to put in context any gains of the eight minute target for 
the ambulance service in light of the historical and cultural aspects of its integration 
within the NHS. Due to their small organisational size, uniformed culture, and the 
nature of their job in dealing with emergencies, ambulance services have traditionally 
been seen both by the public and other NHS colleagues as the health arm of the 
emergency services rather than an emergency arm of health services. They have still 
largely remained on the outer periphery of decision making networks within the NHS 
hierarchy. Many senior executives pointed out that the response time targets have 
helped ambulance trusts to build their capacity and capability in terms of greater 
funding, manpower, vehicles, and infrastructure. There was an overall consensus that 
there has been significant investment over the last two decades that has helped the 
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organisations to gain in confidence and aspire for a bigger role within the local health 
economy.  
 
What this paper argues is that the eight minute target has distorted the actual 
functioning of ambulance trusts in England and has skewed the way different 
stakeholders react to the target. Most importantly, the continuing focus on the eight 
minute target has a potential to adversely affect the future modernisation agenda of 
developing clinical performance indicators and clinical education to its staff. Such 
counter-vailing tendencies are also supported in the literature that a single 
performance target has dominated and sometimes “distorted” ambulance service 
priorities CHI (2003, p.22);  that the ambulance performance reports were heavily 
focussed on the response time targets (drFoster intelligence, 2006, p. 21) and 
recommendations of the Audit Commission (1998, p. 75). Radcliffe and Heath (2009, 
p. 419) have recently argued that performance measurement regime and the prevailing 
organisational culture in the ambulance service have also reinforced each other but to 
promote the primacy of response times thus acting as a “brake” on the reform process. 
These could be key factors in aiding their integration into the wider NHS and to their 
aspirations of becoming an active member in the local health economy.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has discussed some of the unintended consequences of the current 
ambulance service performance measurement in England. The difficulty in measuring 
the quality aspects of the organisation’s performance has meant that the organisational 
focus on the eight minute response has pushed out indicators that are difficult to 
measure but might be more relevant such as the CPIs. We  have argued that the 
current performance targets are centrally driven and centrally directed, lack flexibility 
to deal with local differences, put pressure on the staff to perform, and can lead to 
serious unintended consequences. These arguments advance the central argument by 
Turner et al., (2006, p. 75) that further reforms should focus on better ‘targeting and 
clinical care’ rather than further response time improvements. One key consideration 
of decision makers in devising targets is to establish realistic levels of achievement 
before a target is set. It is been acknowledged that as any managerial tool targets need 
time to develop, performance targets should have capacity to be revised in the light of 
the experience in their implementation and should be responsive to change (Audit 
Commission, 2000; Jackson, 1988; Likierman, 1993) . This study has revealed that 
the main ambulance performance indicator of the eight minute response has been 
revisited (DoH, 2005a) but only for the purpose of making it shorter (Call to Connect 
target) thus putting further pressure on the organisation.  
 
Such a detailed and systematic account of the unintended consequences of ambulance 
performance measurement system appears to be lacking in the literature. These 
findings are significant for our understanding of the current performance framework 
being used in the UK. Future evaluation of the performance measurement system 
should take into account, the various unintended consequences documented in this 
study. These findings bring fresh evidence to such an important issue and help to 
address the knowledge gap and encourage further research and published evidence 
discussed in the previous section. 
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However, it will be important to highlight the limitations of this study. The findings 
discussed in the paper are based on the perceptions and subjective experience of the 
key individuals who participated in the research and are mediated by the time-frame 
of the study. These arguments do suggest that performance framework should not 
only be evaluated on the basis of the expected behaviour in term of improvements in 
the chosen measures but should also take into account, the unanticipated 
consequences (Smith, 1996, 2005; Bevan and Hood, 2006). At one hand, the current 
performance framework and the specific policy solutions discussed earlier in this 
paper focus on the reform of the eight minute target. But the future direction of travel 
for ambulance trusts in England (DoH, 2005a) envisages amongst other things, the 
development of clinical performance and clinical skills of the ambulance paramedics 
which at present are not measured nationally.  
 
The paper addresses the importance of finding out ‘discernible’ effects of a 
performance measurement system and a wide ranging educational effort about the 
role and interpretation of the performance data within the wider literature (Bevan and 
Hamblin, 2009; Hibbard et al., 2003; Bird et al., 2005; Goldstein and Spiegelhalter, 
1996). Further research in this regard will help to identify the characteristics of 
different schemes which influence successfully the behaviour of the NHS staff to 
secure improved health outcomes as well as measured outcomes (Jacobs al et., 2006). 
There appears to be a genuine need to initiate new methods of communication and 
learning to imbue the staff with the requisite knowledge about individual contribution 
and organisational role in performance measurement. This will bring significant 
changes in organisational culture and practices (Mannion et al., 2005), along with the 
improved effectiveness in all areas.  
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